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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EQUITY RULE AND
THE BANKRUPTCY RULE IN PROVING SECURED
CLAIMS' AGAINST INSOLVENT ESTATES
IN KENTUCKY*
In the case of Banco-Kentucky's Receiver v. The National
Bank of Kentucky's Receiver,' the question was presented as to
whether a secured creditor of an insolvent corporation could
have the full benefit of his security, and at the same time could
prove against the free assets of the insolvent the full amount of
said creditor's claim or not. This question involved whether
the equity rule or the bankruptcy rule was in force in Kentucky,
or whether both of them were in force, depending on the state of
case presented.
The Court, in its opinion, referred to the learned discussion
of this question in the report of the Special Master in the court
below,2 the Honorable Lafon Allen, but due to considerations of
space, did not incorporate that discussion in the opinion. That
it may be available to the Bar, it is here reproduced:
"As between secured creditors and general creditors of an
insolvent, their relative rights in distribution of assets, as estab-
lished by statute or by court decisions in this state, are as
follows:
" (1) Under a voluntary assignment by an insolvent for
the benefit of all creditors, without discrimination, a secured
creditor, prior to the Act of 1894, which for the first time fixed
by statute the rights of creditors under a voluntary assignment3
had the right to make double proof, that is to say, he could prove
his whole claim against both funds (to-wit, his security and the
assets assigned) and was entitled to share, upon that basis, in
both funds, although, of course, he could not receive more than
the whole amount of his demand.4
* The introductory paragraphs were written by Richard Priest
Detzman, member of the Louisville, Kentucky Bar. The citations
found in the Special Master's report have been edited.-Fd.
1281 Ky. 784, 137 S.W. (2d) 357 (1939).
2 See 281 Ky. 784, 818, 137 S.W. (2d) 357, 375 (1939).
3 Weiser v. Muir, 103 Ky. 479, 45 S.W. 512 (1898).4 Logan v. Anderson, 18 B. Mon. 114 (1857); Hibler, Etc. v. Davis'
Adm'r., 13 Bush 20 (1877); Citizens Bank of Paris v. Patterson, 78
Ky. 291 (1879).
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"This rule was not applicable to voluntary assignments
alone. It was not followed in all jurisdictions, there being a sub-
stantial diversity of views upon the subject. It was, however,
followed by the courts of the United States (except where a
different rule was fixed by statute, as in cases of bankruptcy)
and in a substantial number of important states, including Ken--
tucky. In those jurisdictions in which it obtained, it was ap-
plicable not only to voluntary assignments but to all distributions
of insolvent estates, except where there was a different statutory
rule. A full and interesting discussion of this subject is to be
found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Merrill, Receiver of the First National Bank v. National Bank
of Jacksonville.5 An elaborate review of the recent cases on
this subject will be found in an annotation to First Wisconsin
National Bank of Milwaukee v. Kingston, State Commissioner of
Banking.6 This annotation is supplementary to an earlier
annotation to the case of Citizens and Soathern Bank v. Alex-
ander, Receiver of the Irish American Bank.7 It will be noted
that it both of these annotations Kentucky is put down as fol-
lowing the equity or chancery rule, allowing double proof, except
as changed by statute.
"(2) Prior to the Act of 1892, explained below, in the dis-
tribution of the estate of an insolvent decedent, a secured creditor,
whose contract security was insufficient to pay his demand in
full, was excluded by statute from any share in free assets until
after general creditors had received a sum equal, pro rata, with
such lien creditors.8
"In such a case, the secured creditor, after general creditors
had been made equal with him, was entitled to share upon the
basis of his whole claim, without giving credit for what he had
received from his special security. But, by the Act of 1892, this
rule was changed and it was provided that, in such a case, the
secured creditor, instead of being required to wait until general
creditors had been made equal with him, was allowed to share
with them from the beginning, but only upon the basis of the
173 U.S. 130, 43 1a ed. 640 (1899).
6 213 Wis. 681, 252 N.W. 153 (1934).
L.R.A. 1918B, 1024.
$Gen. Stat, Ch. 39, Art. 2, secs. 33, 34; Spratt's Ex'x. v. First
National Bank of Richmond, 84 Ky. 85 (1886).
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unpaid balance of his claim, after giving credit for the proceeds
or value of his special security.9
"(3) In cases where the security (or priority) of the
secured creditor arose, not from a contract between him and his
debtor, but 'out of a rule of equity, or statutory discrimination
between creditors '10 the secured creditor was subject to the
equitable rule of equal reprisal, that is to say, if his security was
insufficient to pay his demand in full, he was not allowed to
share with general creditors until they had received from
fee assets enough to indemnify them for the loss which they
had suffered through the application of his securties exclusively
to the discharge of his demand. This, it will be observed, was the
former rule (prior to the Act of 1892), governing the distribution
of an insolvent decedent's estate. 1"
"There were two situations in which this rule was applied:
(a) Where the second creditor was a bank which had a
charter lien upon its shares owned by an insolvent debtor.12
(b) In partnership cases, where the partners make assign-
ments of both individual and firm assets for the benefit of indi-
vidual and firm creditors, and the latter claim the right to be
subrogated to the right of each partner to have firm assets first
applied to the discharge of firm debts.13
"(4) It will be noted that, in the above eases, the dif-
ference in the basis upon which secured creditors were allowed
to share in the distribution of free assets (when not controlled
by statute) depended upon a difference in the origin of their
security. If it arose from a contract, then the secured creditor
could make double proof but, if it arose out of a rule of equity
.or a statutory discrimination between creditors, he was subject
to the rule of equal reprisal. We come now to a case in which
a discrimination was made, not because of the origin of the
security, but because of the origin of the right to share in a
'Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 3869.
"Supra, n. 2.
* Spratt's Ex'x. v. First National Bank of Richmond, supra, n. 6.
8) German Security Bank v. Jefferson, etc., 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 326(1874).
-Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Keizer, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 169
(1865); Fayette National Bank of Lexington v. Kenney's Assignee,
79 Ky. 133 (1880); Hill, et al. v. Cornwall and Bros., Assignee, 95 Ky.
Z12, 26 S.W. 540 (1894).
NOTES
distribution of free assets. This is the case of Bank of Louis-
vile v. Lockridge.14  In that case, the notes held by the bank
against the debtor were secured by pledges of collateral. The
bank, becoming doubtful of the solvency of the debtor, secured
the pledge of additional collateral, whereupon Lockridge, an
unsecured creditor, sued for and obtained a judgment that the
latter pledge operated as an involuntary assignment for the
benefit of all creditors, since it was made in contemplation of
insolvency and with design to prefer the bank. The bank claimed
that it had the right to make double proof, just as if the assign-
ment had been voluntary. The court held that he could not do
this.
"This ruling was based upon a construction of certain pro-
visions of the Act of 1856 which, as the court found, indicated
"that the legislature regarded the act of insolvency" (that is,
the preferential conveyance) as placing the estate of the insolvent
debtor in the same condition and to be distributed in the same
manner as the estate of a decedent. As we have seen, the rule of
equal reprisal had, by statute, been made applicable to the
distribution of the estate of an insolvent decedent, and, accord-
ingly, the court applied that rule in the Lockridge case. This
rule, as applied to insolvent decedents' estates, was changed by
an Act of 1892 and, in the same year, the Act of 1856 (prefer-
ential conveyance statute) was changed in the same manner, so
that the present law, applicable to both of those classes of cases,
is that the secured creditor may prove against free assets only the
balance of his demand after crediting his security.
"(5) By an act of 18941r the same rule was made applicable
to the voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors.16
"(6) As to banks in liquidation, an act of 1912 provided
that a secured creditor could prove against free assets only the
unsatisfied balance of his demand. It is perhaps worthy of note
that, by an act of 1934, this rule as to banks in liquidation was
changed and the former equity or chancery rule, allowing double
proof, was reinstated.
"(7) It is well understood, of course, that in bankruptcy
cases the federal statute allows a preferred creditor to prove
1192 Ky. 472, 18 S.W. 1 (1892).
Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 3869.
' Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 74.
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only the unsatisfied balance of his demand against free assets and
consequently this rule is sometimes referred to as the "bank-
ruptcy rule."
"It is thus seen that the present rules in Kentucky with
reference to the rights of secured creditors in the distribution
of the estates of insolvents are as follows:
"The secured creditor can prove against free assets only the
balance of his demand, after giving credit for his security in
the following circumstances:
(a) Where there has been a voluntary assignment.
(b) Where the insolvent is dead.
(c) Where there has been a preferential conveyance result-
ing in an involuntary assignment.
(d) Where the security was not obtained by contract with
the insolvent.
"In all other cases the chancery or equity rule announced
in Logan v. Anderson,17 which allows a secured creditor to make
double proof, still obtains."
27 Supra, n. 2.
